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Determining Habitual Residence under the Hague Convention:
Parental Intent Should be Dispositive
Part I: Introduction
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“Hague
Convention” or the “Convention”) is an agreement that was adopted to deal with the issue “of
child abduction by family members,” which regularly transpires in relation to transnational
custody disputes.1 The Convention is “a treaty between multiple signatory countries wherein the
countries agree to cooperate in returning children to their home country for custody
proceedings.”2 The purpose of the Hague Convention is “to protect children internationally from
the harmful effects of their wrongful removal or retention and to establish procedures to ensure
their prompt return to the State of their habitual residence . . . .”3 The role of a court in applying
the Hague Convention, “is not to determine whether a child is happy where it currently is, but
whether one parent is seeking unilaterally to alter the status quo with regard to the primary locus
of the child’s life.”4
The question of how a child’s habitual residence is determined under the Hague
Convention is the subject of varying approaches among the United States Circuit Courts.5 There
are two potential standards for determining a child’s habitual residence, which are parental intent
(“parental standard” or “Mozes framework”) and the child’s perspective (“child standard”).6
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This Note will argue that parental intent should be conclusive in determining a child’s habitual
residence under the Hague Convention. Neither the Hague Convention nor its implementing
legislation in the United States, the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (“ICARA”)
define the phrase “habitual residence.”7 In the majority of the cases that are filed under the
Hague Convention, the child’s parents disagree as to where the child’s habitual residence is
located.8 The determination of the location of a child’s habitual residence is important because
“wrongful removal” can occur only if the child has been taken away from his or her habitual
residence.”9
Every circuit has confronted the question of how a child’s habitual residence should be
determined and has adopted one of the two approaches, either the parent standard or the child
standard.10 All of the circuits consider some common factors in making this determination,
including: “changes in physical location, the location of personal possessions and pets, the
passage of time, whether the family retained its prior residence or sold it before relocating,
whether the child has enrolled in school, the parents’ intentions at the time of a move, and
whether the child has established relationships in the new location.”11 The divide in the circuits
essentially involves whether the determination of a child’s habitual residence is based on
parental intent or the child’s perspective.12 This issue has yet to be addressed by the United
States Supreme Court. This paper will discuss the background of the Hague Convention in Part
II and the various approaches to the question of determining a child’s habitual residence taken by
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the Circuit Courts in Part III. In Part IV, this paper will argue that the determination of a child’s
habitual residence should be based on parental intent.
Part II: Background of the Hague Convention
The Convention was adopted in October of 1980.13 The United States helped formulate
the Hague Convention and “became a signatory in 1981.”14 As of 2012, 87 countries had
become signatories to the Hague Convention.15 Congress enacted the ICARA “as the
implementing legislation for the Hague Convention”16 ICARA declares the Hague Convention
“as the law of the United States, provides definitions, sets forth jurisdiction, and addresses
certain details regarding how the United States will enforce the provisions of the treaty.”17
The Convention contemplates a ubiquitous concern regarding the harm inflicted on
children by parental kidnapping and a compelling desire amongst the signatory states to execute
an effective restraint on such behavior.18 The Hague Convention’s approach towards
international child abduction is straightforward.19 The Convention aims to “restore the factual
status quo which is unilaterally altered when a parent abducts a child and aims to protect the
legal custody rights of the non-abducting parent.”20
The Hague Convention was not drafted in direct “response to any concern about violent
kidnappings by strangers.”21 Rather, the Convention purports to discourage parents from
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absconding with their children and traveling over international borders in anticipation of
receiving a “favorable custody determination in a friendlier jurisdiction.”22 The Convention’s
main goal is to “secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in
another signatory state.”23 The Hague Convention aims to deter abduction by “depriv[ing] [the
abductor’s] actions of any practical or judicial consequences.”24 The Convention achieves this
goal “not by establishing any substantive law of custody, but rather by acting as a forum
selection mechanism, operating on the principle that the child’s country of habitual residence is
best placed to decide upon questions of custody and access.”25 Thus, the basis for proceedings
under the Convention is “not to establish or enforce custody rights, but only to provide for a
reasoned determination of where jurisdiction over a custody dispute is properly placed.”26
Despite similarities, a Hague Convention case differs from a child custody case.27 If the Hague
Convention is applied, in many cases the ultimate “decision on custody will be made by the
authorities of the child’s habitual residence prior to its wrongful removal.”28 In sum, the Hague
Convention simply addresses jurisdiction.29 The Convention does not deal with substantive
custody decisions.30
For the Convention to apply, it is essential that the abducted child was “habitually
resident in a Contracting State immediately before any breach of custody or access rights.” 31 In
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order to be litigable under the Convention, child abduction and retention cases have to be
international.32 Additionally, in cases involving the United States, the other country involved
must also be a signatory to the Convention.33 Signatory states are required to have judicial and
administrative remedies established “for the return of children taken from the State of their
habitual residence to another signatory State in violation of the left-behind parent’s custody
rights under the law of the State of the child’s habitual residence.”34 Proceedings under the
Convention and ICARA “do not reach the merits of an underlying custody dispute.”35
In the United States, a petitioner “invokes the protections of the Convention by filing a
petition in state or federal court under ICARA.”36 The court must then resolve the case pursuant
to the Hague Convention.37 If a petitioner can establish a prima facie case under the Hague
Convention, the child must be returned to the place of their habitual residence, unless the
respondent demonstrates that an affirmative defense is applicable.38 The petitioner bears the
burden of proving a prima facie case “by a preponderance of the evidence.”39 Courts have found
that a petitioner presents a prima facie case if three elements are met: “(1) prior to removal or
wrongful retention, the child was habitually resident in a foreign country; (2) the removal or
retention was in breach of custody rights under the foreign country’s law; and (3) the petitioner
actually was exercising custody rights at the time of the removal or wrongful retention.”40 It is
also important to note that, although most courts find proof of a prima facie case after these three

32

Id.
Id.
34
Redmond, 724 F.3d at 737.
35
Barzilay, 600 F.3d 917.
36
Id.
37
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
38
Litigating International Child Abduction Cases Under the Hague Convention, Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton
LLP and the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children (2012),
http://www.missingkids.com/en_US/HagueLitigationGuide/hague-litigation-guide.pdf
39
Id.
40
Id.
33

5

elements are met, a fourth element is ultimately taken into consideration.41 A petitioner must
show that the abducted child is under the age of 16, pursuant to Article IV of the Hague
Convention.42 This provision states, “[t]he Convention shall cease to apply when the child
attains the age of 16 years.”43
The main inquiry in petitions pursuing the return of a child under the Convention is
determining if the child has been “wrongfully” removed or retained as per the definition of the
Convention.44 It is essential to recognize that “wrongful removal” is a legal term that is defined
in the Convention rather than “an ad hoc determination or a balancing of the equities.”45 Under
the Hague Convention, Article III defines wrongful removal or retention as follows:
“a) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution
or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which
the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or
retention; and
b) at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised,
either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal
or retention.”46
The location of habitual residence is significant because the laws of that country govern
the parents’ custody rights.47 Even though the determination of “habitual residence” is crucial,
the phrase is not defined in the Hague Convention or the ICARA.48 In 2010, the Hague
Permanent Bureau took a poll from signatory countries to seek input regarding the practicability
and desirability of a protocol to the Hague Convention to define “habitual residence.”49 No
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protocol of this nature has been enacted to date.50 The United States was against the addition of
a definition of “habitual residence.”51 The United States’ reasoning is that it would be difficult
for the signatory countries to reach an agreement on the meaning of the phrase.52 Courts in the
United States treat the question of habitual residence “as a mixed question of law and fact that is
a highly fact-specific inquiry.”53 The habitual residence of a child is ascertained at the moment
“immediately before the removal or retention.”54 Besides this basic direction, the Convention
provides no guidance “as to which, if any, factors are to be given weight.”55 Therefore, a large
mass of domestic and international law has been created.56
Part III: Circuit Court Approaches to “Habitual Residence”
The different approaches adopted by the Circuit Courts as to how a child’s habitual
residence is determined will be discussed below. Section A will discuss the Circuit Courts that
have adopted a parental standard and Section B will discuss the Circuit Courts that have adopted
a child standard.
A. Parental Standard
In 2001, the Ninth Circuit interpreted “habitual residence” for the first time within the
meaning of the Convention.57 In Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1069 (9th Cir. 2001), Arnon
and Michal Mozes were Israeli citizens who had four children together.58 The Mozes family
lived in Israel until 1997.59 In April of 1997, with Arnon’s permission, Michal and the four
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children moved to California.60 The parents agreed that Michal would live in the United States
for 15 months with the children.61 Despite this consensus, the two disagreed over whether or not
they had an agreement for the children to live in the United States beyond the 15 months.62
Arnon filed a petition seeking the return of the children under the Hague Convention.63 While
the oldest child elected to return to Israel, the three younger children remained in the United
States pursuant to the United States District Court for the Central District of California’s denial
of Arnon’s petition.64
The Ninth Circuit stressed the importance of the determination of a child’s habitual
residence.65 The court noted that “[h]abitual residence is the central – often outcomedeterminative – concept on which the entire system is founded.”66 The Ninth Circuit noted that
“being habitually resident in a place must mean that you are, in some sense, ‘settled’ there—but
it need not mean that’s where you plan to leave your bones.”67 The court also noted “[n]or could
we justify limiting habitual residence to persons who settle in an area for some particular
motive.”68 Before discussing whose intent is dispositive, the court stated that generally speaking,
the first step in obtaining a new habitual residence is establishing a settled intention to desert the
one left behind.69 Otherwise, a child is not habitually residing, rather, one is elsewhere for a
temporary absence of either a short or long period of time.70 The individual does not need to
possess this settled intent at the time of departure and the intent does not need to be explicitly
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stated if it is obvious from the individual’s actions.71 The court gave the example of an
individual who has lived continuously in the same location for numerous years.72 The court
stated that it would be “hard-pressed” to find that the individual did not abandon their prior
habitual residence.73
The Ninth Circuit then discussed intent regarding the determination of a child’s habitual
residence.74 The court took issue with the Sixth Circuit, which had found that the child’s intent
is dispositive and the parents’ intent is irrelevant.75 The court explained that while the child’s
intent seems to be the obvious answer to the question of whose intent governs the determination,
“[c]hildren, particularly the ones whose return may be ordered under the Convention, normally
lack the material and psychological wherewithal to decide where they will reside.”76 The court
held that “in . . . cases where the intention or purpose is relevant – for example, where it is
necessary to decide whether an absence is intended to be temporary and short-term – the
intention or purpose which has to be taken into account is that of the person or persons entitled to
fix the place of the child’s residence.”77 The court acknowledged that issues frequently arise
when the people who are entitled to choose the child’s residence disagree as to where it is.78 The
court found that in these situations, the representations of the parties cannot be taken at face
value.79 The Ninth Circuit instructed that courts must review all of the available evidence and

71

Id.
Id. at 1074.
73
Id.
74
See Id. at 1076.
75
See Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1076.
76
Id.
77
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
78
Id.
79
Id.
72

9

conclude whether the parent seeking the return of the child has already approved of the child
establishing their habitual residence where the child currently resides.80
Ultimately, the court found that although the decision to change a child’s habitual
residence is contingent on the parents’ settled intention, the parents cannot accomplish this
change simply by wishful thinking.81 The court noted that first, “it requires an actual change in
geography. Second, home isn’t built in a day. It requires the passage of an appreciable period of
time, one that is sufficient for acclimatization.”82 If a child moves to a different country with
both of their parents, who take actions to establish a regular home together, the time period does
not need to be long.83 “On the other hand, when circumstances are such as to hinder
acclimatization, even a lengthy period spent in this manner may not suffice.”84
The court acknowledged that a tougher question is presented when evidence of
acclimatization should be adequate to determine a child’s habitual residence, even if there is
uncertain or contrary parental intent.85 The court found that it is generally accepted that, “given
enough time and positive experience, a child’s life may become so firmly embedded in the new
country as to make it habitually resident even though there be lingering parental intentions to the
contrary.”86 Where there is no settled parental intent, “courts should be slow to infer from such
contacts that an earlier habitual residence has been abandoned.”87 The court highlighted that the
purpose of the Hague Convention is to prevent child abduction by lessening “the incentive of the
would-be abductor to seek unilateral custody over a child in another country.”88 Ultimately, the
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court concluded that the easier the habitual residence of a child can be changed without the
consent of both parents, the bigger the incentive to try.89
The court found that habitual residence is meant “to be a description of a factual state of
affairs, and a child can lose its habitual attachment to a place even without a parent’s consent.”90
In situations where “there is no settled intent on the part of the parents to abandon the child’s
prior habitual residence, courts should find a change in habitual residence if the objective facts
point unequivocally to a person’s ordinary or habitual residence being in a particular place.”91
The issue in cases like these is not only whether the child’s life in the new country expresses a
“minimal degree of settled purpose, but whether we can say with confidence that the child’s
relative attachments to the two countries have changed to the point where requiring return to the
original forum would not be tantamount to taking the child out of the family and social
environment in which its life has developed.”92
The court held that in a situation like the Mozes family, where “children already have a
well-established habitual residence [Israel], simple consent to their presence in another forum
[California] is not usually enough to shift it there. Rather, the agreement between the parents and
the circumstances surrounding it must enable the court to infer a shared intent to abandon the
previous habitual residence, such as when there is effective agreement on a stay of indefinite
duration.”93 In sum, the Ninth Circuit held that a child’s habitual residence is ascertained based
on the parents’ intent as to their child’s residence and “the child’s perspective of where he or she
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is acclimated.”94 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court because
the district court seemed “to have relied upon an understanding of [habitual residence] that gives
insufficient weight to the importance of shared parental intent under the Convention” and did not
answer the question of “whether the United States had supplanted Israel as the locus of the
children’s family and social development.”95
In 2004, the Eleventh Circuit interpreted “habitual residence” for the first time within the
meaning of the Hague Convention.96 In Ruiz v. Tenorio, 392 F.3d 1247, 1249 (11th Cir. 2004),
Melissa Green Tenorio and Juan Tenorio Ruiz had two children together, who were both born in
the United States in 1992 and 1998.97 In August of 2000, the couple moved from the United
States to Mexico.98 Then, in May of 2003, Melissa took their two children to the United States
without Juan’s knowledge or permission.99 Juan filed a petition on July 29, 2003 seeking the
return of his children under the Hague Convention, which the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida denied.100
The Eleventh Circuit adopted the framework announced by the Ninth Circuit in Mozes.101
The court stated that “[a]fter thoroughly canvassing the relevant case law, we conclude that the
opinion of Judge Kozinski in Mozes is not only the most comprehensive discussion of the issue,
but also sets out the most appropriate approach.”102 The court summarized the Ninth Circuit’s
analysis in Mozes and then ultimately concluded that the district court’s denial of Juan’s petition
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was proper and affirmed the judgment. 103 The court focused on “the crucial finding of fact by
the district court that Juan and Melissa never had a shared intention to abandon the prior United
States habitual residence and to make Mexico the habitual residence of their children.”104 The
court reasoned that there were various objective facts that showed that Melissa did not have the
intention of living in Mexico permanently, which included credit cards and bank accounts that
she maintained in the United States.105 The court also noted that even Juan’s intent regarding the
permanence of the family’s move to Mexico was unclear.106 In short, the Eleventh Circuit
adopted a parental standard for determining a child’s habitual residence.
In 2005, the Second Circuit interpreted “habitual residence” for the first time within the
meaning of the Convention in Gitter v. Gitter, 396 F.3d 124, 128 (2d Cir. 2005).107 In Gitter, the
child, Eden, was born in December of 2000 in New York.108 Following Eden’s birth, Mr. Gitter
convinced Ms. Gitter that moving the family to Israel was a good idea for various reasons.109
The family moved to Israel in March of 2001.110 Once the Gitter family arrived in Israel, Mr.
Gitter either sold or gave their family’s belongings that had been placed in storage in New York
to Ms. Gitter’s sister.111 Additionally, the Gitters enrolled their son in day care in Israel.112 In
February of 2002, Ms. Gitter traveled to New York with Eden. Ms. Gitter then conveyed to Mr.
Gitter that it was her aspiration to remain in the United States with Eden.113 Mr. Gitter
ultimately convinced Ms. Gitter to return to Israel in the early months of 2002 by giving her his
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word that if after six months she was unhappy, then she could return back to the United States
with Eden.114 In June of 2002, Ms. Gitter returned to the United States with her son Eden,
supposedly on a vacation, and did not return to back to Israel.115 Mr. Gitter then filed a petition
seeking the return of Eden under the Hague Convention.116 The United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York denied Mr. Gitter’s petition after determining that Eden’s
habitual residence “remained the United States throughout the Gitters’ stay in Israel.”117
The Second Circuit adopted a two-step analysis to determine a child’s habitual
residence.118 The first step in the inquiry is for the court to look into the shared intent of the
individuals who are qualified to choose the child’s residence, typically the parents, “at the latest
time that their intent was shared.”119 The Second Circuit instructed that in making this
ascertainment the court ought to look “at actions as well as declarations.”120 Ordinarily, the
shared intent of the child’s parents controls the location of the child’s habitual residence.121 The
court acknowledged that the Hague Convention is concerned only with the habitual residence of
the child and therefore it might appear rational to focus the attention on the child’s intentions.122
However, the court noted, “children . . . normally lack the material and psychological [ability] to
decide where they will reside.”123 The second step of the inquiry is for the court to ask whether
the evidence clearly signals that the child “has acclimatized to the new location and thus has
acquired a new habitual residence, notwithstanding any conflict with the parents’ latest shared
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intent.”124 In sum, the Second Circuit selected a test which would analyze parental intent as well
as the child’s level of acclimation to the residence in determining the child’s habitual
residence.125
The Second Circuit then applied this two-prong analysis to the facts of the case.126 Under
the first prong, the court found that the district court considered whether Mr. and Ms. Gitter
jointly intended that Israel would be their son’s habitual residence.127 The court then held that
the district court accurately concluded that Mr. and Ms. Gitter did not have a settled mutual
intent for Israel to be Eden’s habitual residence.128 Under the second prong, the Second Circuit
did not take a position.129 The court remanded the case in order for the district court to apply the
new standard that it had articulated in this case.130 In short, the Second Circuit adopted a
parental standard for determining a child’s habitual residence.
In 2006, the Seventh Circuit interpreted “habitual residence” for the first time within the
meaning of the Hague Convention.131 In Koch v. Koch, 450 F.3d 703, 709-10 (7th Cir. 2006),
Dane and Antonia Koch had two children together, who were both born in the United States.132
The family moved to Germany when the youngest child was only eleven days old in April of
2002.133 The couple experienced martial difficulties and in May of 2005, Mr. Koch took the
children with him from Germany to the United States without Ms. Koch’s permission or
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knowledge.134 Ms. Koch filed a petition seeking the return of her two children under the Hague
Convention, which the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin
granted.135
The Seventh Circuit held that in determining a child’s habitual residence, the first step in
the analysis is to figure out if the child’s parents shared an intent to abandon the previous
habitual residence.136 To determine the parents’ intent, the court must consider actions in
addition to declarations.137 A child’s habitual residence “is not determined by wishful thinking
alone.”138 Rather, there must be a real change in geography and the passing of a considerable
amount of time in order to establish a habitual residence.139 “When the child moves to a new
country accompanied by both parents, who take steps to set up a regular household together, the
period need not be long.”140
The Seventh Circuit pointed out that under the Ninth Circuit case of Mozes v. Mozes, 239
F.3d (9th Cir. 2001), courts do not need to ignore reality.141 Rather, in Mozes, the Ninth Circuit
had taken “the realities of children’s and family’s lives” into consideration “despite the parent’s
hopes for the future.”142 The Seventh Circuit noted that the Ninth Circuit held that “it was
keenly aware of the flexible, fact-specific nature of the habitual residence inquiry envisioned by
the Convention” and “courts must consider the unique circumstances of each case when
inquiring into a child’s habitual residence.”143 The court quoted Mozes and noted that “[h]abitual
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residence is intended to be a description of a factual state of affairs, and a child can lose its
habitual attachment to a place even without a parent’s consent.”144 From this proposition, the
Seventh Circuit concluded that the district court was correct in holding that the Koch children’s
habitual residence was Germany.145 The court pointed out that the question in determining a
child’s habitual residence, is, as the Ninth Circuit in Mozes stated, “whether [a court] can say
with confidence that the child’s relative attachment to the two countries have changed to the
point where requiring the return to the original forum would not be tantamount to taking the
child out of the family and social environment in which its life has developed.”146 Ultimately,
the court affirmed the district court’s judgment.147 The Seventh Circuit has since reaffirmed the
analysis for how to determine a child’s habitual residence that it adopted in Koch in Walker.148
In the 2009 case of Maxwell v. Maxwell, 588 F.3d 245, 251 (4th Cir. 2009), the Fourth
Circuit interpreted “habitual residence” within the meaning of the Hague Convention.149 In
Maxwell, Andrew and Kristina Maxwell met and married in 1999 in Australia.150 The couple
then moved to Massachusetts where their quadruplets were born in 2004.151 In December of
2005, Andrew and Kristina experienced marital difficulties, and as a result, Andrew moved back
to Australia while Kristina and the children moved to North Carolina.152 In August of 2007, the
couple decided to reconcile and discussed arrangements for Kristina and the quadruplets to move
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to Australia.153 Kristina contemplated that the move to Australia might simply be temporary and
consequently purchased round trip tickets for her and the children to Australia for a three month
period from December 4, 2007 until March 4, 2008.154 After Kristina and the children arrived in
Australia, the couple again experienced martial problems.155 Andrew took the quadruplets’
passports in an effort to prevent Kristina from leaving Australia with the children.156 In February
of 2008, the U.S. Embassy reissued the quadruplets’ passports without Andrew’s approval.157
Kristina and the children immediately left Australia and returned to the United States.158 Andrew
then filed a petition seeking the return of the quadruplets under the Hague Convention, which the
United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina denied.159
The Fourth Circuit adopted a two-step analysis in determining a child’s habitual
residence.160 The first step in the analysis is to consider parental intent.161 The second step in
the analysis is to consider “whether there was an actual change in geography coupled with the
passage of an appreciable period of time, one sufficient for acclimatization by the children to the
new environment.”162 Regarding the first step of the analysis, the Fourth Circuit provided
numerous factors that can be considered to help determine parental intent, which include
“parental employment in the new country of residence; the purchase of a home in the new
country and the sale of a home in the former country; marital stability; the retention of close ties
to the former country; the storage and shipment of family possessions; the citizenship status of

153

Id.
Id. at 248.
155
Maxwell, 588 F.3d at 248.
156
Id.
157
Id. at 249.
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
Id. at 251.
161
Maxwell, 588 F.3d at 251.
162
Id.
154

18

the parents and children; and the stability of the home environment in the new country of
residence.”163 Regarding the second step of the analysis, the Fourth Circuit also provided
various factors to be taken into consideration, including “school enrollment, participation in
social activities, the length of stay in the relative countries, and the child’s age.”164
The Fourth Circuit applied this standard to the facts of the case and found that the
quadruplets’ habitual residence was the United States.165 In regards to the first step of the
analysis, the court found that “there was no shared parental intent to abandon the United States
as the quadruplets’ habitual residence.”166 The court found numerous facts that supported the
conclusion that Kristina intended for the move to Australia to be temporary, including that
“Kristina left many possessions behind in North Carolina; Kristina reserved round trip tickets for
herself and the children; Kristina and the children traveled with Australian tourist visas that
limited their stay in Australia to three months; and Kristina maintained her local financial
accounts, North Carolina Medicare insurance, and the lease and insurance on her vehicle.”167 In
regards to the second step of the analysis, the court found that the children never became
acclimatized to Australia during the two month period that they lived there.168 The court
supported this conclusion by citing to the facts that “the quadruplets were not receiving therapy
for their developmental disabilities in Australia despite the fact that they were receiving therapy
when they lived in the United States. [Additionally], the quadruplets did not attend school or
participate in social activities in Australia.”169 To summarize, the Fourth Circuit adopted a
parental standard for determining a child’s habitual residence.
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In sum, the five Circuit Courts that have adopted the parental standard seem to focus on
two major considerations in determining the location of a child’s habitual residence, which are
parental intent and the child’s acclimation. As to the child acclimation consideration, Circuit
Courts following the parental standard seem to analyze the degree to which a child has had time
to possibly acclimate in a given location.
B. Child Standard
In contrast to the five circuits that have adopted the parental standard to determine a
child’s habitual residence, three circuits have utilized the child standard in resolving this issue.
In 1995, in the case of Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 1995), the Third Circuit
interpreted “habitual residence” for the first time within the meaning of the Hague
Convention.170 In Feder, the child, Evan, was born in July of 1990 in Germany.171 In October of
1990, the Feder family relocated to Pennsylvania because of Mr. Feder’s new job.172 In 1993,
the Feder family moved from Pennsylvania to Australia because of another job offer that Mr.
Feder received.173 On or about June of 1994, Ms. Feder left her husband and returned to the
United States with her son Evan.174 In September of 1994, Mr. Feder filed a petition under the
Hague Convention seeking the return of Evan to Australia.175 The United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied Mr. Feder’s petition.176
The Third Circuit vacated the district court’s decision because it concluded that “a child’s
habitual residence is the place where he or she has been physically present for an amount of time
sufficient for acclimatization and which has a degree of settled purpose from the child’s

170

See Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 1995).
Id. at 218.
172
Id.
173
Id.
174
Id. at 220.
175
Id.
176
Feder, 63 F.3d at 222.
171

20

perspective.”177 The court also noted that “a determination of whether any particular place
satisfies this standard must focus on the child and consists of an analysis of the child’s
circumstances in that place and the parents’ present, shared intentions regarding their child’s
presence there.”178 The court applied this standard to the facts of the case and found that Evan’s
habitual residence was in Australia, given that “Evan moved, with his mother and father, from
Pennsylvania to Australia where he was to live for at the very least the foreseeable future, and
staying in Australia for close to six months, a significant period of time for a four-year old
child.”179 The court also reasoned that while Mr. and Ms. Feder thought of Australia very
differently, both decided to move to Australia and live there together with their son, “and did
what parents intent on making a new home for themselves and their child do – they purchased
and renovated a house, pursued interests and employment, and arranged for Evan’s immediate
and long-term schooling.”180 To summarize, the Third Circuit adopted a child standard for
determining a child’s habitual residence.
In the 1993 case of Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1400-01 (6th Cir. 1993), the
Sixth Circuit interpreted “habitual residence” for the first time within the meaning of the Hague
Convention.181 In Friedrich, Emanuel and Jessica Friedrich had one child together, Thomas,
who was born in Germany in December of 1989.182 The Friedrich family lived in Germany
together until the summer of 1991.183 In August of 1991, Ms. Friedrich flew to the United States
with Thomas without Mr. Friedrich’s permission or knowledge.184 Mr. Friedrich filed a petition
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seeking the return of his son under the Hague Convention, however, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio denied the petition.185
The court held that Thomas’s habitual residence was Germany and therefore reversed the
district court’s denial of Mr. Friedrich’s petition.186 The Sixth Circuit reasoned that a child’s
habitual residence cannot be confused with their domicile.187 Courts must focus the attention on
the child and not the parents in its determination of a child’s habitual residence.188 Courts must
also examine past experience rather than future intentions.189 The court went on to explain that a
child can only have one habitual residence.190 Habitual residence relates to customary residence
before the removal.191 “The court must look back in time, not forward.”192 In sum, the court
“focused on the child’s acclimation and past experiences in a specific location to establish
habitual residence” and adopted a child standard in determining a child’s habitual residence.193
In the 2007 case of Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 989 (6th Cir. 2007), the Sixth Circuit
reaffirmed the analysis of a child’s habitual residence that was adopted in Friedrich, which
focused on the child’s prior experiences and not the intent of the parents.194 The court
recognized that some other circuit courts consider “the subjective intent of the parents[,]”
however it rejected this approach as “it has made seemingly easy cases hard and reached results
that are questionable at best.”195 The court pointed out that the Convention is designed to
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prevent cases in which “the child is taken out of the family and social environment in which its
life has developed.”196 The court found that courts that examine parental intent often reach
outcomes inconsistent with this objective.197 Further, the court pointed out that the official
commentary on the Convention, the Perez-Vera Report, declares that the Convention should be
analyzed bearing in mind “the general principle . . . that children must no longer be regarded as
parents’ property, but must be recognised [sic] as individuals with their own rights and needs.”198
The court found that this proposition is best given effect by a standard that follows the child’s
view of where their home is, as opposed to one that subordinates the child’s experience to their
parents’ personal wishes.199
In the 2003 case of Silverman v. Silverman, 338 F.3d 886, 897 (8th Cir. 2003), the Eighth
Circuit interpreted the phrase “habitual residence” within the meaning of the Hague
Convention.200 In Silverman, Robert and Julie had two children together, who were both born in
the United States.201 The family moved across the United States and ultimately purchased a
home in Minnesota, where the family lived until July of 1999, when they moved to Israel.202 In
June of 2000, Julie and the children traveled back to the United States, on what Julie told Robert
was a summer vacation.203 However, Julie and the children did not return to Israel.204 Robert
filed a petition seeking the return of his children under the Hague Convention, which the United
States District Court for the District of Minnesota denied.205
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The Eighth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court and found that in
determining a child’s habitual residence under the Hague Convention, “[t]he court must focus on
the child, not the parents, and examine past experience, not future intentions.”206 The court
noted that the federal courts all agree that habitual residence consists of some form of “settled
purpose.”207 The settled purpose does not have to be to stay in a new place forever, however, the
family “must have a sufficient degree of continuity to be properly described as settled.”208 The
court added its view that the settled purpose must be from the child’s perspective as opposed to
the parents, recognizing however, parental intent is still taken into consideration.209 The Eighth
Circuit noted that the facts of this case are similar to the facts in the Third Circuit case, Feder v.
Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1995). The court agreed with the Third Circuit that one
spouse who harbors hesitation during a move does not destroy the settled purpose from the
child’s viewpoint.210 Ultimately, the court reversed the district court’s ruling and held that the
habitual residence of the children was in Israel given that “Julie intended to move permanently to
Israel prior to the move and, upon arrival in July, she intended to make Israel her home.”211 The
court further noted that Julie was the main force behind the Silverman family’s move to Israel
[from Minnesota] and she always planned on returning back to Israel to raise her kids.212 The
court concluded that Julie’s post-move desire to travel back to the United States did not change
the finding that the habitual residence of the Silverman children changed from Minnesota to
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Israel.213 To sum up, the Eighth Circuit adopted a child standard in determining a child’s
habitual residence.
In the 2010 case of Barzilay v. Barzilay, 600 F.3d 912, 918-920 (8th Cir. 2010), the
Eighth Circuit reaffirmed the analysis that it adopted in Silverman v. Silverman, 338 F.3d 886
(8th Cir 2003).214 The court highlighted the importance of focusing on the child’s perspective in
determining habitual residence.215 In 2017, the Eighth Circuit again discussed Silverman and the
propositions that it stands for, as discussed above.216 The court further illuminated relevant
factors in determining habitual residence from the child’s perspective, including “the change in
geography, the passage of time, and the acclimatization of the child to the new country.”217
Part IV: Parental Standard is the Proper Standard for Determining Habitual Residence
Because of the split among the circuits, as well as the lack of decisional law on point in
several circuits, the Supreme Court must articulate an appropriate standard for deciding a child’s
habitual residence. “A majority of the circuits have preferred the Ninth Circuit’s approach and
adopted the so-called Mozes framework.”218 This paper argues that parental intent should be
dispositive, thus following the Second, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits’ approach
and rejecting the child standard of the Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits. Initially, it should be
noted that the parental standard or Mozes framework does not only consider parental intent, as
the child’s acclimation is also part of the analysis in determining where the child’s habitual
residence is located.219 In other words, the parental standard and the child standard are not
entirely in conflict with one another. Rather, the question is of emphasis. While the extent to
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which a child has had time to potentially acclimate in a certain location may be an appropriate
factor to consider as a potential indication of parental intent, the child’s acclimation should not
be the focus of the habitual residence analysis as the parental standard is easier to implement
than the child standard.
The ease of application of the parental standard as opposed to the child standard is
evident. The Fourth Circuit has provided several factors that may be considered in order to
determine parental intent, most of which are objective and do not depend upon the parents
subjective intentions, such as “parental employment in the new country of residence; the
purchase of a home in the new country and sale of a home in the former country . . . the storage
and shipment of family possessions; [and] the citizenship status of the parents and children.”220
When these factors are taken into consideration, there is little room for debate between the
parents. It should be noted, however, that not all of the Circuit Courts have used these factors in
ascertaining parental intent. Other Circuit Courts have considered the parents stated intent as
part of the analysis.221 The best approach would be to use the factors that the Fourth Circuit
provided in Maxwell. The use of these factors will promote consistency in the decisions of
Hague Convention cases among the Circuit Courts.
Additionally, as the Second Circuit pointed out in Gitter, the first step of the inquiry in
determining a child’s habitual residence is for the court to look into the shared intent of the
individuals who are qualified to choose the child’s residence, typically the parents, “at the latest
time that their intent was shared.” [emphasis added]222 The key phrase is “at the latest time that
their intent was shared.” Thus, the fact that the majority of cases filed under the Hague
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Convention consist of parents who disagree as to the location of their child’s habitual residence
will not prevent courts from applying the parental intent test because the determination of the
child’s habitual residence is not based on the parents current desires, rather it is based on their
preferences at the last point in time when their intent was shared.
In adopting the child standard, the Sixth Circuit found that the Hague Convention is
designed to prevent cases in which “the child is taken out of the family and social environment in
which its life has developed” and that this principle is best given effect by a standard that follows
the child’s view of where its home is, “rather than one which subordinates the child’s
experiences to their parents’ subjective desires.”223 This statement mischaracterizes the approach
taken by the Circuit Courts that follow the parental standard. None of the Circuit Courts include
“parents’ subjective desires” as part of the analysis for determining a child’s habitual residence.
Shared parental intent “at the latest time that their intent was shared” is not equivalent to parents’
subjective desires. Rather, shared parental intent involves the issue of whether the child’s
parents shared an intent to abandon the previous habitual residence.224
Further, focusing on parental intent, rather than the child’s intent, is much less likely than
the child standard to lead to confusion. Critics feel that looking at parental intent muddles the
analysis of habitual residence. However, courts would find it even more difficult to decide a
case based on the, sometimes unknowing, intent of the child. “[C]hildren . . . normally lack the
material and psychological [ability] to decide where they will reside.”225 In all of the cases
previously discussed in this paper, the children were very young, with ages ranging from four to
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thirteen years old, when the petition was filed under the Convention.226 The argument against
using the parental intent standard is further flawed because young children do not have the
mental capacity to choose a habitual residence. The Third Circuit believes that “a child’s
habitual residence is the place where he or she has . . . a degree of settled purpose from the
child’s perspective.”227 Although practically speaking, a preteen or teenager may be able to
experience “a degree of settled purpose,” a young child arguably cannot reach such a conclusion.
Most young children lack any understanding or awareness of where their home is, who they live
with, how long they have lived there, etc. Moreover, even a child who has a rough idea of where
their habitual residence is may not be able to convey that opinion to others, especially in the
cases where the child involved is as young as four years old. In sum, the use of a child intent
standard will be difficult for courts to apply because young children’s feelings or wishes can be
hard to determine with any accuracy.
Additionally, to the extent that courts must make ordinary custody determinations every
day that consider a young child’s presumed feelings about his or her living arrangements, one of
the tools that is most often used is an evaluation conducted by a psychologist, social worker, etc.
To use an approach such as this in a Hague Convention case would create a slippery slope for
courts as the decisions would resemble substantive custody determinations, which the
Convention expressly prohibits.228 Rather, in Hague Convention cases, courts are limited to
addressing the proper jurisdiction for the custody disputes.229
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Another potential issue with focusing primarily on the child’s acclimation is that this may
raise issues with respect to siblings. Some children adjust quicker than others to change.
Therefore, in cases involving more than one child, there may be a brother who adjusted to a
particular location and a sister who has not acclimated to the new location. Based on the
background of the Convention discussed in Part II of this paper, it seems as though the drafters
of the Convention likely did not contemplate that at the initial stage of determining jurisdiction
based on a child’s habitual residence, that courts could reach decisions that may separate young
children from their siblings. This would seem much more analogous to a substantive law
decision than a procedural determination of the proper jurisdiction for a case.
Finally, a potential issue that may arise in Hague Convention litigation is if there is a case
before one of the Circuit Courts that has adopted the parental standard and there is a conflict
between parental intent and the child’s acclimatization. For example, if the Circuit Court finds
that the location of the child’s habitual residence under step one of the analysis (parental intent)
was X and the location of the child’s habitual residence under step two of the analysis (child
acclimatization) was Y. If the Circuit Court finds that the child’s habitual residence is location
Y, then it seems as though in this scenario, the parental standard is essentially identical to the
child standard as parental intent becomes irrelevant. As such, if the United States Supreme
Court determines that the proper standard for determining a child’s habitual residence is the
parental standard, then it is crucial that the Court ascertain how the lower courts must treat this
issue.
Part IV: Conclusion
The method for determining a child’s country of habitual residence is important because
a finding of wrongful removal, which then triggers the return of a child to that country, can only
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arise if a child has been taken from their country of habitual residence in violation of custody
rights.230 “[E]very Hague Convention petition turns on the threshold determination of the child’s
habitual residence; all other Hague determinations flow from that decision.”231 While “[t]he
framers of the Hague Convention intentionally left ‘habitual residence’ undefined, and intended
that the term be defined by the unique facts in each case[,]” the Supreme Court needs to address
this issue in the near future.232 The uncertainty in the courts is only going to grow if the Supreme
Court does not ascertain the appropriate standard for determining a child’s habitual residence. A
uniform approach is desperately needed in order to ensure consistent decisions in Hague
Convention cases. To sum up, the best approach to determine a child’s habitual residence is the
parental standard, primarily because of its ease of application as contrasted with the child
standard.
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